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The Debt-Equity Question in the Federal Income
Taxation of Corporations: W ill.New Section 385
Make Tax Planning a Reality?
INTRODUCTION
For many years the corporate tax planner has faced the possibility
that what appears to him to be bona fide debt will be seen by the In-
ternal Revenue Service or a federal district court as equity. Despite
honest efforts to produce results that will meet with the approval of the
Service, by reliance on past Service positions, or court decisions, the tax
planner is likely to find that his efforts will be challenged and that the
court in which his position is litigated will ignore at least some of its
own prior conclusions in reaching its decision. While the goal of every
tax planner, a clear set of rules to be followed in order to achieve an un-
assailable result, may not be possible, or even desirable, in the area of
corporate debt, yet it should be possible for the Treasury Department
to provide criteria for a capital structure that will be relatively safe
from attack.
'In the Tax Reform Act of 19691 Congress provided new section 385
for the purpose of distinguishing debt from equity.2 Section 385 dele-
gates virtually unlimited authority to the Secretary of the Treasury or
his delegate to define corporate debt and equity by regulations for all
purposes of the Internal Revenue Code.3 Section 385(b) states that the
regulations to be promulgated for section 385 ",.. shall setforth fac-
tors . . .- 4 to be taken into account in determining "in; a given factual
situation whether a debtor-creditor or a corporation-shareholder rela-
tionship exists. Section 385(b) then lists five factors which may be in-
cluded in the factors settled upon by theTreasury:
(1) whether there is a written unconditional promise to pay -on
demand or on a specified date a sum certain in money in return
for an adequate consideration in money or money's worth, and
to pay a fixed rate of interest,
. Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, 82 Stat. 487, amending NT. REv..
CODE oF 1954 [hereinafter cited as Tax Reform Act].
2. 1969-3 CuM. BuL. 511..
3. INT. Rav. CoDE oF 1954, § 885(a).
4. Id. § 385(b).
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(2) whether there is subordination to or preference over any in-
debtedness of the corporation,
(3) the ratio of debt to equity of the corporation,(4) whether there is convertibility into stock of the corporation,
and
(5) the relationship between holdings of stock in the corporation
and holdings of the interest in question. 5
The Senate Report for the Tax Reform Act of 1969 makes it clear that
the five factors listed in section 385(b) are not intended to be the only
factors included in the regulations or that
. . with respect to a particular situation, any of these factors must
be included in the guidelines, or that any of the factors which are
included by statute must necessarily be given any more weight
than other factors added by regulations.,
The language of the Senate Report seems to authorize whatever stan-
dards the Treasury deems proper. But, even with such broad delegation
from Congress, the Treasury may find the task of delineating debt and
equity ". . . formidable, and perhaps impossible . . .7
Because in the past, there have been no Treasury regulations to assist
the corporate planner in providing safe instruments of indebtedness for
the corporation, and because the Internal Revenue Service has been
unwilling to issue advance rulings concerning whether corporate ar-
rangements are debt or equity,8 the federal courts have developed some
guidelines to aid them in determining what qualifies as bona fide debt.
But, as one commentator has noted:
[t]o look to the case law for guidance is to invite bewilderment.
There have been literally hundreds of decisions over a period of
about 20 years.... You can find a case which supports almost any
reasonable argument. 9
This commentator suggests that in a "really hopeless"10 case, the best
approach is to ask for a district court jury trial because if
... you drew a halfway sympathetic judge, you should stand a 50-50
chance, for no twelve ordinary people would ever understand all
5. Id.
6. S. REP. No. 91-552, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 138 (1969) (reprinted at 1969-3 Cum. BuTu.
511).
7. Plumb, The Federal Income Tax Significance of Corporate Debt: A Critical Analysis
and a Proposal, 26 TAx L. REv. 369, 577 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Plumb].
8. Rev. Proc. 69-6, 1969-1 Cum. Buu.. 396.
9. Hickman, The Thin Corporation: Another Look at an Old Disease, 44 TAxas 883,
885 (1966).
10. Id.
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the double tax involved, and would probably end up flipping a
coin.11
That such advice is seriously given and received is evident from a peru-
sal of the cases in the area. That the advice is necessary is an indication
of the need for the reform provided for in section 385.
DEBT-EQUITY-AN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
The determination whether an instrument represents debt or equity
is important to the corporate issuer because the tax consequences of
debt are usually more favorable to the corporation than the tax conse-
quences of equity. Under present tax law, a corporation is permitted
to deduct interest paid by it on its debt but it is not allowed a deduc-
tion for dividends paid by it on its stock or equity.' 2 The Senate Report
reflects the congressional concern that the debt-equity question has
assumed added importance in recent years because of the increased level
of corporate merger activities and the increasing use of debt for such
acquisition.13 Since the tax consequences of debt make it advantageous
for the corporation to finance its activities, to the maximum extent,
through debt rather than stock,14 an unexpected classification as equity
may have serious ramifications for the corporation. 15 And, while the
government normally seeks to have the questioned instrument classified
as equity whereas the corporation and shareholders argue for a debt
classification, the roles may be reversed; ". . . and both taxpayers and
government may take inconsistent positions in different years, depend-
ing on the context in which the issue arises."' 6
The government and the corporate or individual taxpayer most often
find themselves litigating the debt-equity question on one of three oc-
casions: (1) on the receipt of the "debt" obligation in exchange for
11. Id.
12. 1969-3 CUM. BULL. 510; see INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 163(a).
13. 1969-3 Cum. BuLL. 511.
14. Plumb, supra note 7, at 372.
15. B. BrITKER & J. EUSTICE, FEDERAIL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND SHARE-
HOLDERS 4.02 (2d ed. 1966) [hereinafter cited as BrIrrER & EusTIcE]. For example, if
purported debt is found to be a second class of stock, the corporation's Subchapter S
election will be ineffective. See INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 1371-79. Other examples of
serious side effects occasioned by a finding of equity include: loss of § 337 benefits if assets
are retained beyond the twelve-month period to pay off "creditors"; loss of reorganization
status if purported debt securities are discharged for cash or other debt instruments;
and, conversion of an assumed "purchase transaction" into a tax-free reorganization if
debt issued as the consideration is held to constitute stock. See BITTKER & EUSTICE, 4.02,
at 4-6 & n.9.
16. Id. 4.02; see Zilkha & Sons, Inc., 52 T.C. 607 (1969).
597
Duquesne Law Review
property, raising the issue of recognition of gain or loss to the transferor
and basis to the transferee in the typical section 351 situation; (2) dur-
ing the time when the instrument is outstanding, when the corporation
deducts paid or accrued "interest"; and, (3) at maturity of the instru-
ment, when it is characterized by the holder at collection or when it is
written off as worthless.' 7 Although the debt-equity question is raised
in many other situations, this discussion will consider primarily these
three situations, in the context of close corporations since'it is the close
corporation's shareholder who becomes creditor in suspect circum-
stances.
The essential difference between a shareholder and a. creditor of a
corporation is that the shareholder is an "... adventurerin the corpo-
rate business ... .. "k.s He takes the risks and shares in the success. But,
the creditor, as compensation for not sharing in the corporate success,
is to be paid ". . . independently of the risk of success; and gets a right
to dip into capital when the payment date arrives."'19 The classic defini-
tion of debt is very similar to the first factor listed in section 385(b).
Debt is
7 .. an unqualified obligation to pay a sum certain at a reasonably
close, fixed maturity date alongwith a fixed percentage of interest
payable regardless of the debtor's income or lack thereof.20
The significance of the debt-equity distinction is that the corporation is
permitted by the Internal Revenue Code to deduct its cost for the use
of money that it will return, because such cost is a business expense. 21'
But, when a corporation pays dividends, it is not incurring a business
expense, rather it is distributing profits, and should not be able to de-
duct any "cost" for so doing.2 As to instruments which are called debt
by the holder who is also a shareholder, the Internal Revenue Service
will argue that where the risk of repayment is high, the instrument can
only be regarded as an evidence of risk capital so that any payment of
"interest" to the holder by the corporate debtor is not permitted the
usual interest deduction because the congressional policy allows such
17. Id; see Plumb, supra note 7, at 372-403 (an exhaustive analysis of variations on
these three themes, including cases cited for each variation). The scope of this comment
prevents detailed analysis of the multitude of cases decided under these themes.
18. Id. at 404; see Commissioner v. O.P.P. Holding Co., 76 F.2d 11 (2d Cir. 1935).
19. Plumb, supra note 7, at 404.
0. Gilbert v. Commissioner, 248 F.2d 399, 402 (2d Cir. 1957).
21. See INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 163.
22. 248 F.2d at 407.
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:deductions for bona fide debt costs and not for returns on risk capital.23
The same policy argument is made to prevent bad debt deductions24 in
'the case of a loss Which is in substance a loss of risk capital labeled as
debt.2 5
In early tax cases, the courts were willing to distinguish debt from
equity by looking at the intent of the parties.2 6 The early decisions
looked also for a fixed maturity date at which the holder would have
an unconditional right to demand repayment.27 The problem with the
use of intent of the parties or a fixed maturity date as the criteria for
judging whether an instrument be considered debt or equity is that
where the partiesare a corporation and its shareholders the expressed
intent or the ability to enforce payment at maturity are often formal
incidents of the instrument with no real intention to demand a creditor's
rights on the part of the shareholders.
So that finally, courts were forced to look beyond the face of the
instrument to ascertain "whether the investment, analyzed in terms
of its economic reality, constitutes risk capital entirely subject to
the fortunes of the corporate venture or represents a strict debtor-
creditor relationship.128
As courts began to understand that the formal characterization of the
instruments by the parties involved, even if supported by book entries
and formal declarations of intent, should not be allowed to obscure the
substance of the transactions, 2 9 they created considerable confusion by
generating lists of criteria to be used in making the debt-equity deter-
mination.30
These lists of criteria seem to go on in an endless line, with most
districts or circuits selecting from a list that one compiler sets at thirty-
eight in number 3l those factors that seem appropriate for thefacts at
hand. The Fifth Circuit seems to most consistently apply the same set
-of criteria to the debt-equity question, relying on a list of eleven factors
23. Id.
24. See INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 166.
25. See Gilbert v. Commissioner,' 248 F.2d 399 (2d Cir. 1957).
26. See Commissioner v. Meridian & Thirteenth Realty Co., 132 F.2d 182 (7th Cir.
1942) (the court found an intent of the parties not to violate a state statute).
27. See Commissioner v. H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc., 141 F.2d 467 (1st Cir. 1944); United
.States v. Title Guaranty & Trust Co., 133 F.2d 990 (6th Cir. 1943).
28. Plumb, supra note 7, at 406.
29. J. MERTENS, LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION .§ 26.06 (Supp. 1972).
30. Plumb, supra note 7, at 407-09.
.31. Holzman, The Interest-Dividend Guidelines, 47 TAXEs 4 (1969).
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to be weighed in relation to each new set of facts. The eleven factors are
set out in Monclair, Inc. v. Commissioner,3 2 and are referred to and
used in almost every subsequent Fifth Circuit case following the Mont-
clair decision.8 3 But, the same circuit stated that
... each case must be decided on its unique fact situation, and no
single test is controlling or decisive in making this determination.3 4
What this means is that in most instances the government as well as the
taxpayer
.. are at the very mercy of what some writers have called "whim,"
or the trial judge's "experience with the wellsprings of human con-
duct," and "the acuity of [the trial judge's] sense of smell."35
The guidelines developed by courts, however diverse they may be,
nonetheless do focus on certain considerations which recur in the cases
in this area. In most cases the debt-equity ratio is discussed. This ratio
was introduced in the dictum of John Kelley Co. v. Commissioner,36
and has been popularized as the "thin capitalization" doctrine. 7 The
doctrine now means that corporate obligations will not be given debt
status when the ratio of debt to equity is so large that shareholder-
creditor rights will be worthless in the event of failure of the corpora-
tion.38 Thin capitalization is normally associated with close corpora-
tions in the determination of the extent to which the money advanced
has been put at the risk of the business. 89 The history of the debt-equity
ratio as a factor in the analysis of close corporations' shareholder ad-
32. 318 F.2d 38, 40 (5th Cir. 1963). The factors listed in Montclair are:
(1) the names given to the certificates evidencing the indebtedness;
(2) the presence or absence of a maturity date;
(3) the source of the payments;
(4) the right to enforce the payment of principal and interest;
(5) participation in management;
(6) a status equal to or inferior to that of regular corporate creditors;
(7) the intent of the parties;
(8) 'thin' or adequate capitalization;
(9) identity of interest between creditor and stockholder;
(10) payment of interest only out of 'dividend' money;
(11) the ability of the corporation to obtain loans from outside lending institutions.
33. See Tyler v. Tomlinson, 414 F.2d 844 (5th Cir. 1969); Berkowitz v. United States,
411 F.2d 818 (5th Cir. 1969).
34. 411 F.2d at 820.
35. Plumb, supra note 7, at 409.
36. 326 U.S. 521 (1946).
37. Stone, Debt-Equity Distinctions in the Tax Treatment of the Corporation and
Its Shareholders, 42 TuaL. L. REv. 251, 255 (1968).
38. Id.
39. Id. at 256.
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vances can be divided into three periods which reflect the attention of
the courts on the intent of the parties.40 The courts have not applied
any mathematical formula to establish a safe debt-equity ratio, and have
applied the concept more sparingly in recent years.41 Some decisions
have even referred to the ratio as irrelevant.42
Another guideline used by courts to decide the debt-equity question
is the proportionality of the holding of debt and stock. Where debt and
stock are held pro rata by shareholders, there is a strong inference that
the form debt is really equity.43 The question the court must answer
when considering the proportionality of shareholder-creditor holding
is whether a shareholder would eliminate his own corporation by de-
manding his rights as a creditor.44 But, holding disproportionate
amounts of debt and stock may make the debt valid.45
Courts also look to the purpose to which the advance is put in deter-
mining whether the advance is debt or equity. If the debt is assumed
in order to acquire the assets essential to the corporation, the advance
may be seen by the courts as equity because the corporation is held to
have been undercapitalized. 46 When the debt is assumed to acquire
unessential assets, courts will generally look to other relevant factors to
determine the debt-equity status. 47
Although intent is not the vital factor it once was in the debt-equity
question intent is still weighed by some courts in varying degrees.
Objective intent such as contained in the documentation of an ad-
vance of money is generally not to be afforded special weight. It
alone cannot be controlling of the debt-equity issue. However,
analysis [of the generally accepted criteria], including the objective
expression of intent, leads to subjective resolution of the ultimate
40. Caplin, The Caloric Count of Thin Corporations, 17 N.Y.U. INST. ON FED. TAX.
771, 774 (1959). Caplin sees the history of thin corporation as a tax problem divided
into three major periods: 1) pre-1946---a struggle with hybrid securities by searching for
the parties' intent as in Commissioner v. Meridian & Thirteenth Realty Co., 132 F.2d 182,
184 (7th Cir. 1942); 2) 1946-1956-reliance on ratios begun by dicta in John Kelley Co.
v. Commissioner, 326 U.S. 521, 535 (1946); 3) 1956-present--decline of the ratio test which
was replaced by a search for substance, with intent reappearing as a major question but
with factors outside the instrument gaining in importance as in Gooding Amusement Co.
v. Commissioner, 236 F.2d 159 (6th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 1031 (1957).
41. 414 F.2d at 848.
42. See Byerlite v. Williams, 286 F.2d 285 (6th Cir. 1960).
43. Plumb, supra note 7, at 470; see Charter Wire, Inc. v. Commissioner, 309 F.2d
878 (7th Cir. 1962); Gilbert v. Commissioner, 248 F.2d 399 (2d Cir. 1957).
44. Mullin Bldg. Corp. v. Commissioner, 9 T.C. 350, 355-56 (1947), aff'd, 167 F.2d 1001
(3d Cir. 1948).
45. Charles E. Curry, 43 T.C. 667 (1965).
46. Sam Schnitzer, 13 T.C. 43 (1949), aff'd, 183 F.2d 70 (9th Cir. 1950).
47. J.I. Morgan, 30 T.C. 881 (1958).
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issue: Whether the parties in fact intended the -advance to create
debt rather that equity.48
Courts will look for the creation of a formal creditor-debtor relation-
ship, a written debt instrument, "and security for the debt.49 Other
factors which courts will consider as adverse to the contention .that the
advance is debt include the subordination of shareholder loans to out-
sider loans,50 the existence of an unduly long maturity date,51 restric-
tions on the right to enforce payment,5 2 and the lack of a business
motive for incorporating.53
NEW SECTION 385-THE DEVELOPMENT OF A STATUTORY
APPROACH TO DEBT-EQUITY
New section 385 gives a fresh opportunity. for reconsideration of the
difficult questions that have confronted taxpayer, court, and Internal
Revenue Service alike when attempting to determine whether an ad-
vance to a corporation is equity or true debt.54 It is not probable that
the regulations which are prepared under the direction of section 385
will provide a mechanical test to be applied formally to yield the an-
swer to the debt-equity question. This would not be in keeping with
the congressional intent as reflected in the Internal Revenue Code to
treat every corporate distribution to shareholders coming Out of earn-
ings and profits to the extent thereof.55 Congressional concern for the
avoidance of tax' through the excessive use of debt securities is also
found in the Senate Report on the Tax Reform Act of 1969.56 For these
reasons, it is to be expected that the section 385 regulations will not
effect a policy change in the attitude of the Internal Revenue Service
regarding the requirement that shareholder distributions be derived
from earnings and profits. Rather the regulations will' probably
48. A.R. Lantz Co. v. United States, 424 F.2d 1330, 1333-34 (9th Cir. 1970).
49. Wood Preserving Corp. v. United States, 347 F.2d 117 (4th.Cir. 1965).
50. Charles I. Huisking & Co., 4 T.C. 595 (1945). For a note on voluntary subordination
see Plumb, supra note 7, at 497.
51. Swoby Corp., 9 T.C. 887 (1947).
52. Green Bay & W.R.R., 3 T.C* 372 (1944), aff'd, 147 F.2d 585 (5th Cir. 1945).
53. Gooding Amusement Co. v. Commissioner, 236 F.2d 159 (6th Cir. 1956). But see
Kraft Foods Co. v. Commissioner, 232 F.2d 118 (2d Cir. 1956).
54. See New York Bar Ass'n Tax Section Comm. on Reorganization Problems, Recom-
mendations as to Federal Tax Distinction between Corporate-Stock and Indebtedness, 25
TAX. LAW. 57, 58 (1971) [hereinafter cited as N.Y. State Bar].
55. Plumb, supra note 7, at 584; see INT. REV. CODE of 1954, §§ 302, 316(a). See also
Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465 (1935).
56. See note 6 supra.
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*. clarify and regularize ... ,,7 the standards by which bona fide
shareholder debt.can be ascertained. 58
Several commentators have suggested that the proper approach for
the internal Revenue: Service to usewhen formulating the section 385,
regulations is to develop a tier system of tests so that a safe harbor cah
be realized by those who clearly issue or hold debt instruments.59 The
various safe harbor approaches are sufficiently similar so that the study
of one creates an understanding of all. The key to each such proposal
is that at either extreme 'of the debt-equity question lies safe ground
wherein the relationship is clearly debt or equity. But, between the
extremes lies the gray- area-i wherein
the ambivalence of. the factors causes the principal uncertainty
today and where the regulations cannot feasibly provide solutions
with mathematical precision. 60
In the gray area, the regulations will be. valuable to the extent that they.
not merely:list factors in much the way that courts now list them but 'to
the. extent that the regulations include
* .. short' essays on the' significance, if any, to be attached to each
factor or combination of factors; putting them'in perspective and
correcting some aberrant notions that have appeared.6'
Other suggestions for the gray area include developing a series of re-:
buttable presumptions,62 or reliance on revenue rulings' to be issued to
cover the gray areas.63 The safe harbor, although varied in specifics, has
as its goal the protection of the "non-litigious taxpayer" who should be
sheltered from the dangers of the "fringe areas" of debt and equity.
"Tax law should not compel taxpayers to be adventurous.' 4
When drafting the new regulations, for section. 385, several problems
will have to be resolved. A decision regarding the retroactivity of, the
57. Plumb, supra -note 7, at 585.
58. Id.
59. See BITrKER & Eus-IcE, supra note 15, 4.05; Plumb, supra note 7, at 586; N.Y.
State Bar, supra note 54 passim.
60. Plumb, supra note 7, at 587.
61. Id. at 588.
62. N.Y. State Bar, supra note 54, at 62. A rebuttable presumption of equity would
attach to an interest in a corporationheld by a substantial shareholder, for example. The
rebuttable presumptions are intended to be evidentiary in effect, and not to have substan-
tive effect. l .. eieir.nefet.adnttohv .sbtn
63. Id. It will be helpful to have rulings in the gray area between debt and equity. If
the Treasury decides to treat the debt-equity question as one of law, the rulings should be
easier to make. See note 105 supra,.and accompanying textual material.
64. Note, Toward New Modes of Tax Decisionmaking-The Debt-Equity Imbroglio and
Dislocations in the Lawmaking Responsibility, 83 HARv. L. Rv. .1695, 1705 (1970)... ' '
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regulations will have to be made. It has been suggested that the regu-
lations must be prospective in nature so that taxpayers will not find
prior "debt" transactions changed in character.6 5 Other questions con-
cerning debt-equity problems that should be considered by the drafters
of the regulations include: whether classification as debt or equity, once
made, will be permanent; whether instruments can be classified as part
debt and part equity; whether there should be a bias built into the
regulations to decide doubtful cases in favor of equity; and, whether
the debt-equity question is one of law or fact.66
Two of these issues, the question of the permanency of the classifica-
tion and the question whether the debt-equity determination is a matter
of law or fact, are related. These considerations have received less atten-
tion from the commentators than the other issues concerning debt
versus equity. But, it could make a significant difference in the effect
and administration of new section 385 and its regulations to have these
questions answered one way or another.
The question of the permanency of the classification of an instrument
as debt or equity is really a question of the res judicata or collateral
estoppel effect to be given in later years to an administrative or judicial
determination made in a prior year. Income tax is levied on a yearly
basis. Each year is the beginning of a new liability and a separate cause
of action.
Thus if a claim of liability or non-liability relating to a particular
year is litigated, a judgment on the merits is res judicata as to any
subsequent proceeding involving the same claim and the same tax
year. But if the later proceeding is concerned with a similar or
unlike claim relating to a different tax year, the prior judgment
acts as a collateral estoppel only as to those matters in the second
proceeding which were actually presented and determined in the
first suit.67
Collateral estoppel thus operates to prevent "... redundant litigation
of the identical question of the statute's application to the taxpayer's
status." 6  Commissioner v. Sunnen6 9 asserted the position that the col-
lateral estoppel effect of a tax decision is to remain only as long as mat-
ters which have been decided remain ". . . substantially static, factually
65. N.Y. State Bar, supra note 54, at 63; see INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 7805(b).
66. Brrrwt & EUSTICE, supra note 15, 4.06.
67. Commissioner v. Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591, 598 (1948).
68. Id. at 599.
69. 333 U.S. 591 (1948).
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and legally. ' 70 Sunnen makes it clear that collateral estoppel is not to be
applied in tax cases to create "vested rights"71 in decisions that have
become ".... obsolete or erroneous with time, thereby causing inequities
among taxpayers."72
The Court of Claims has followed the position taken in Sunnen. In
cases where the collateral estoppel issue is raised, the Court of Claims
holds that the court ". . . must inquire for each year whether there is
indebtedness."7 The Court of Claims further adds that as to the debt-
equity determination, it is proper for courts to consider the continuing
relationship of the parties claiming debtor-creditor status, so that if it
becomes apparent with the passage of time that the parties have no
intention of maintaining the debtor-creditor relationship, the court may
decide to eliminate any tax benefits accruing from the prior debtor-
creditor status. 74
Viewing the collateral estoppel question slightly differently is the
Tax Court which gives more consideration to prior determinations in
its analysis of a debt-equity issue.75 The Tax Court will consider the
character given to instruments at creation, but will not give the initial
character conclusive weight.76 An analysis of the Court of Claims and
Tax Court cases in this area will, however, reveal the fact that all the
cases were factually similar. In each instance the obligation was kept
by the one originally making the advance, who was the litigant in each
case.
Contrasted with this factual situation are decisions from several courts
of appeals, involving cases in which the obligation was passed to a third
party in an arm's length transaction, and the third party became the
litigant. For the application of collateral estoppel, this is significant
because the party had changed between the prior determination as to
70. Id. at 599.
71. Id.
72. Id. While the taxpayer must not be given vested rights in an outmoded decision, it
should be permitted to the taxpayer to have some assurance that his tax planner can rely
on past determinations as to the debt-equity question. Whether the debt-equity question
can ever be made finally as to any tax problem is improbable because of the shifting factual
circumstances on which tax decisions are based. It is not suggested that the debt-equity
question should be answered initially and never changed, even though the facts may
change. What is suggested is that the new regulations give sufficient guidelines to taxpayers
so that they will not inadvertantly "plan" themselves into new litigation on an old deci-
sion.
73. Cuyuna Realty Co. v. United States, 382 F.2d 298, 301 (Ct. Cl. 1968).
74. Sayles Finishing Plants, Inc. v. United States, 399 F.2d 214, 217 (Ct. Cl. 1968).
75. Ruby, Constructive Transubstantiation of Corporate Investments and Its Tax Con-
sequences, 49 TAXES 666, 668 (1971).
76. Edwin C. Hollenbeck, 50 T.C. 740, 748 (1968).
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debt-equity and the present action. And, when the party in adebt-equity
situition changes, the factors 'to: be weighed and applied necessarily
change also. However, the courts ,of appeals appear to be applying this
rule: if the instrument has been determined immediately before trans-
fer to be equity, it will be considered equity after transfer; but, if the
instrument has been determined immediately before transfer to be
debt; it will be considered debt after transfer.77 ,.
J The effect of these various approaches to the collateral estoppel factor
In litigation pertaining to debt-equity status is that -taxpayers are treated
differently depending on which court hears their case. Thus, there is a
recurring theme in the debt-equity area, not only as to the factors to be
considered but also as to the collateral estoppel effect of prior deter-
minations, which theme is that taxpayers are not treated equally before
the law. Choice of court may not only affect the initial determination as
to whether a relationship is one of debtor-creditor or corporation-share-
holder, but that determination, once made, may be given differing
consideration in later litigation. The regulations for new section 385
should consider the question -of collateral estoppel and provide guide-
lines to be applied by all courts, so that the taxpayer does not suffer
from unequal application of. the income tax or from unequal treatment
once the tax has been applied and is to be litigated.
Closely related to. the collateral estoppel question is the question
whether the determination as to debt-equity status is one of fact to be
found by the trier of fact in the same way it finds all other facts, or
whether the debt-equity question is one of law to be determined by the
court after all the facts are in.78 For many years, it was well-established
that the debt-equity question was a question of fact to be decided by
the trier of fact.7 9 Perhaps the most often-repeated statement in the
debt-equity decisions was the statement that the question is one of fact
and that no one factor is controlling.8 0 Because this statement was the
basis for each court's analysis of the litigation at hand,. another state-
ment often accompanied it: that because each debt-equity case must be
decided on' its own unique fact situation,"' therefore, the criteria to be
77. Ruby, supra note 75, at 670.
78. Id. at 666.
79. See A.R. Lantz co. v. United States, 424 F.2d 1330 (9th Cir. 1970); Diamond Bros.
Co. v. Commissioner, 322 F.2d 725 (3d Cir. 1963); Matthiessen v. Commissioner, 194 F.2d
659 (2d Cir. 1952).
80. See note 79 supra; see, e.g., Austin Village, Inc. v. United States, 432 F.2d 741 (6th
Cir. 1970). -
81. See notes 79-80 supra; see, e.g., Turner Tire Co. v. United States, 344 F. Supp. 634
(M.D. La. 1972).
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used varied with the case and no comprehensive set of criteria could
be compiled. 8 2
Because the debt-equity question was universally considered to'be
one of fact, the courts found their powers of review limited. For a time
the Dobson v. Commissioner8 doctrinewas followed to prevent review
of Tax Court determinations of fact.8 4 That doctrine led to such absurd
results85 that the Internal Revenue Code was amended to provide for
review of Tax Court decisions ". . . in the same manner and to the
same extent as decisions of the district courts in civil actions tried with-
out a jury .... "8
After the Commissioner v. Duberstein8 7 decision, the courts of ap-
peals began to use the "clearly erroneous" test'of that case to limit their
review to matters of law, not reversing factual determinations unless
the trial courts determination as to debt-equity status was clearly
wrong.8 Using the Duberstein language as a talisman, the courts of
appeals continued to apply varying factors and to give varying weights
to the factors chosen as they addressed the question whether the trial
court had been wrong in its factual determination.89 It may be con-
cluded by the objective observer that the chief concern of the courts of
appeals was to avoid as much as possible the substantive considerations
necessary to a meaningful review of the debt-equity question, instead
filling the complex area with factors to fit every need. The question-of-
fact language was raised to eliminate the need to consider the economic
or policy issues behind the debt-equity confusion. The taxpayer was,
indeed, left at the mercy of the trial judge's sense of smell.90
To a great extent this is the situation that prevails today. Recently,
however, the courts of appeals have begun to differ as to whether the
debt-equity question is one of fact or one of law.91 The 'questions of
fact in a given situation are ".. those questions which may be decided
without reference to any rule or standard prescribed by the state--:that
82. See Florida-Georgia Corp. v. United States, 331 F. Supp. 36 (M.D. Ga. 1971); Kings-
mill Corp., 28 T.C. 330 (1957).
83. 320 U.S. 489 (1943).
84. Stone, supra note 37, at 254.
85. Compare John B. Kelley Co. v. Commissioner, 326 U.S. 521 (1946), with Talbot Mills
v. Commissioner, 326 US. 521 (1946).
86. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 7482(a).
87. 363 U.S. 278 (1960).
88.. See, e.g., A.R. Lantz v. United States, 424 F.2d 1330, 1334 (9th Cir. 1970).
89. See notes 79-82 supra.
90. See note 35 supra.
91. See Ruby, supra note 75, at 666; see, e.g., Berkowitz v. United States, 411 F.2d 818
(5th Cir. 1969).
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is without reference to law.' '92 When facts are in issue, the jury or ad-
ministrative body can, as the trier of fact, determine their existence
without any reference to the consequences that the state may attach to
the determination.8 If a question is characterized as one of fact, the
court can pretend that it must affirm if the finding of fact is supported
by reasonable evidence.9 4 But, if the question is one of law, the court
of review cannot avoid its responsibility to determine ". . whether
it is or is not a case for the exercise of the judicial lawmaking power."95
This dichotomy is easily stated, but the problem arises in the applica-
tion of the principle.
The delusive simplicity of the distinction between questions of law
and questions of fact has been found a will-of-the-wisp by travellers
approaching it from several directions.96
Verbal ingenuity easily produces the desired result,9 7 as debt-equity
cases attest.
Even in the absence of regulations, the Treasury has been required
to provide some definition of debt and equity. Its definition has been
to say that the question is one of fact so that the definition is worked
anew for each case. But the underlying question of law has remained
unanswered: what principle is to be applied to yield the correct result
in each case?98 "Certainly is of enormous practical desirability .... "99
because of the financial reliance placed on the content of tax rules. It is
unreasonable to expect taxpayers to guess at the tax rule which will be
applied to their particular case. 'There must be a consensus to guide
courts and the tax administrative agency in their determinations as to
the debt-equity question in the various factual situations which form
the basis of tax cases. If one principle is not attainable, then at the least,
92. Brown, Fact and Law in Judicial Review, 56 HARV. L. REv. 889, 901 (1943).
93. Id.
94. Jaffe, Judicial Review: Question of Law, 69 HARV. L. REv. 239, 241 (1956).
95. Id. In the debt-equity area, this means that the crucial determination is left to the
Tax Court and the district courts, largely. When one considers that there are many district
courts and that the Tax Court members generally sit alone, it becomes clear that there
can be many and varied answers to the debt-equity question. If the question were to be
made one of law, the reviewing courts could look de novo at the debt-equity issue in order
to impose consistent standards of decision on the lower courts.
96. Isacco, The Law and the Facts, 22 COLUM. L. REv. 1 (1922).
97. Paul, Dobson v. Commissioner: The Strange Ways of Law and Fact, 57 HARV. L.
REv. 753, 812 (1944).
98. Note, Toward New Modes of Tax Decisionmaking-The Debt-Equity-Imbroglio
and Dislocations in the Lawmaking Responsibility, 83 HAsv. L. Rsv. 1695, 1698 (1970).
99. Id. at 1707-08.
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the Treasury can provide by regulation an arbitrary set of rules to
govern the debt-equity question,100
.. for there is nothing wrong in relying on an arbitrary tax rule
which is arbitrary precisely because there is no general agreement
as to the applicable principle.... The real task to draw the lines
in such a way that widely shared economic and social goals may be
achieved. 101
Section 385, in its authorization to the Treasury to write regulations
for the debt-equity area, has specifically delegated rulemaking power
to the Treasury to provide "legislative" regulations which will be bind-
ing on the courts so long as they are within the granted power, issued
pursuant to proper procedure, and reasonable. 1
0 2
Thus, section 385 is at once a congressional prod to the Treasury
and a warning to the courts: the debt-equity question must be re-
solved, and it must be resolved through Treasury rulemaking, not
adjudication. 1°3
If the Treasury will take up the congressional challenge, it can do much
to settle the confusion in the debt-equity area. It should establish a tier
system so that the safe harbor is held out to the taxpayer wishing to
seek its shelter. The safe harbor approach will serve to free those tax-
payers, corporate and individual, who want to forego the possible tax
advantages of a debt stance in order to be assured of Internal Revenue
Service approval of their corporate financial position. The safe harbor
has, however, one flaw, which must be considered by the Treasury when
it proposes regulations for new section 385. The tier approach will only
protect and define those transactions which are clearly debt or equity
in their nature. The transactions which compose the bulk of debt-equity
cases today are those which would fall into the gray area of the safe
harbor. approach, and which would, therefore, require. litigation even
under the tier system. It seems clear, therefore, that the federal courts
will still play an important part in the new safe harbor regulations. The
Treasury, then, must prepare a comprehensive set of factors to be ap-
plied uniformly throughout the federal court system in the litigation
of the gray area cases concerning debt-equity matters.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 1704-05.
103. Id.
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There is a plethora of lists of factors for the Treasury :to choose from
in preparing its list. Until proposed regulations are- circulated, any
discussion of the factors to be used to determine the character of trans-
actions in the debt-equity'area must be tentative. There are, however,
certain factors which seem particularly appropriate for inclusion in the
list. Among these are: a fixed and.reasonably early maturity date; an
unconditional obligation to pay interest and principal; priority of the
obligation to all classes of shareholders, even though the obligation may
be subordinated to creditors; debtor-corpo.ration earnings or cash-flow
sufficient to repay the debt; and identity of the creditors. Creditor iden-
tity is important for several reasons. The new regulations should force
a far more careful scrutiny of shareholder-creditors than of outsider-
creditors because the outsider will normally have the intent, so often
alluded to by courts, to act as a creditor and to enforce his creditor's
rights even at the expense of the corporation's existence. Further, the
shareholders-creditor should be expected to show that. his advances are
more than pro rata advances made by all the shareholders to bolster the
capital of a failing close corporation. It may even be that any pro rata
shareholder advance should be given equity status as a matter of course;
in order to prevent the courts' having to evaluate intent in those situa-
tions where common business sense reveals an intent, albeit unexpressed
and couched in formal debt terms, to infuse into a weak corporation the
equity necessary to continued operation.104
Finally, the Treasury should answer the question whether the debt-
equity determination is a matter of law or of fact, so that all courts will
apply the same quantum of judicial review in the debt-equity area. It
should no longer be possible for the Internal Revenue Service to argue
in one circuit court that the matter is a question of law,,while arguing
in another circuit court that the question is one of fact 10 5 Nor should
it be possible for the Service to change its position on appeal because its
104. Whether intent should be considered at all in making the debt-equity determina-
tion-is questionable. The intent as expressed by the parties' outward manifestations will
almost always be to create a debt relationship. That formal intent will be evidenced by
the proper instrument, and whatever other qualifications the particular circuit, or the new
regulations, require. The problem is that when the intent must be judged within the con-
fines of a lawsuit, the parties to the suspect transaction, who are probably the close corpo-
ration and its shareholder, will already have acted contrary to the expressed formal intent.
That contrary action will probably have caused the court action. In such circumstances,
the usefulness of intent as a criterion for determining debt-equity recedes to the vanishing
point.
105. Compare Piedmont Minerals Co., Inc. v. United States, 429 F.2d 560 (4th Cir. 1970),
with Tyler v. Tomlinson, 414 F.2d 844 (5th Cir. 1969).
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position at trial led to an adverse decision.0 6 If the Service. is precluded
from such vacillation, then the taxpayef-will at the least know that his
attitude toward the matter -can be consistent throughout the appellate
procedure. It may be that the correct position to be taken by the new
regulations is that the question is one of law, thereby allowing the jury
to determine what the underlying factual status is and allowing the court
to apply the appropriate law to the facts- as found. In this way the jury
Will not have to weigh the factors and tiers to make the debt-equity de-
termination. Rather, the determination will be made bythe court
which has more experience in weighing the factors and in handling the
complex financial and corporate taxation aspects of such cases.
Tax .planners -should not expect the regulations for section 385 to
solve all their prblems. In such a convoluted and overworked area of
law, it is inevitable that the regulations will fall into some of the traps
previously encountered by courts and the Internal Revenue Service.
What is essential is that the Treasury -thoroughly discuss and weigh
every aspect suggested by experience and business realities for inclusion
in the new. regulations. If itis impossible to make the debt-equity ques-
tion a simple matter, of mechanical tests to be met, it is surely possible
to eliminate some of the, inequity .and confusion that now exists in the
area. By adhering to this course, the, Treasury will fulfill the intent of
Congress
. 
and permit section 1385 to bethe far-reaching solution to the
debt-equity chaos that it can be..
K. JACQUELINE BERNAT
106. See Austin Village, Inc. v. United States, 432 F.2d 741 (6th Cir. 1970)..-
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